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Sensing Absence: How to See What 
Isn’t There in the Study of Science 
and Security
Brian Rappert
What is not of concern in social and political life is the ever-shifting 
shadow to what is of concern.1 At any one time only certain topics 
will garner the limelight in public discussions. Yet, what remains off 
the agenda can be judged to be equally, if not more, important than 
what is so. This is perhaps most obviously evident in the manner pri-
orities change over time and across locations. Swine flu, human traf-
ficking, animal experimentation, HIV/AIDS, and Ebola outbreaks are 
just some instances of topics that have waxed and waned as matters of 
apprehension.
Much the same can be said about how any topics come to be under-
stood. While issues or events could be described in almost any number 
of ways, only certain framings are likely to be prevalent at a given time 
and place. Yet which ones are widespread can be highly consequential 
in suggesting what is at stake. As, for instance, James Revill and Brett 
Edwards note in their chapter in this volume, disfiguring acid attacks 
frequently perpetuated around the world are rarely described as chemi-
cal weapon attacks within the parlance of international diplomacy. 
Through the connections made and not, ways of seeing can obscure or 
sideline considerations. In this sense, presence and absence come bun-
dled together in what is concealed within what is revealed.
With any newfound heightened awareness, regard can be cast on the 
reasons for past indifference or apathy. For instance, some have argued 
that ethical, legal, and social analysis of science has often been reactive 
to scandals, catastrophes, experiments, and so on (rather than proac-
tive in setting out a positive future agenda), and has tended to focus 
on new technologies (rather than the major public health problems 
measured in terms of burden of disease).2 Likewise, avoiding “strategic 
surprise” by learning from the past has long led to soul-searching about 
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disciplinary preoccupations in areas concerned with national security 
(see Walker’s chapter on technological surprise).
With any level of attention, regard can be given to the consequences 
of that attention. Individuals, organizations, professions, and publics 
can be blind to an issue because of the lack of concern, can be blinded 
to aspects of an issue because of how attention gets selectively focused,3 
or can be blinded by an issue because it detracts regard from other 
matters.
Within the study of social and political life then, regard for what is 
being attended to needs to be combined with what is not: what issues 
are not considered, what is not said, what matters are rendered hidden, 
what grievances never get formed, what paths are never pursued. That 
might be because some questions never get asked, pertinent informa-
tion is never shared, forums for collective discussion do not exist, some 
individuals actively work against others knowing, and so on. All such 
social processes characterized by absence are—at least in principal—
open to empirical and theoretical investigation.
Absence in Science, Security and Policy poses a basic question: How can 
those examining the ethical, legal, and social implications of science 
become more mindful about the implications they are not addressing? 
A starting point for this proposal is the contention that key challenges 
for the examination of modern science, technology, and medicine 
include: (i) how issues are identified as matters of concern; and (ii) 
how they become formulated as problems in need of redress. The basic 
move proposed in this volume is a shift, in a sense, backward. The aim 
is one of attending to the whys and hows associated with what is not: 
for who, when, and under what circumstances are matters not treated 
as significant. A number of sub-questions that address themes of ethical 
blindness, taken-for-granted assumptions, and the social construction 
of reasoning will be central, including:
• How have some ethical, legal, and social implications of science 
become rendered (and not) issues of concern?
• What are the everyday routines, practices, social structures that 
shape whether and how topics become (dis-)regarded?
• How have scientists and others fostered attention to or distanced 
themselves from the questionable applications of their work?
While the central aim of Absence in Science, Security and Policy is simple 
in its formulation, addressing it is not. A starting assumption of this 
volume is that questioning taken for granted activities is indispensable 
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in approaching absent concerns. At stake in forwarding our analysis 
of this topic of “non-concerns” are complex considerations of how 
facts,  figures, concepts, and arguments should be made sense of and 
by whom. As will be contended, this requires asking critical questions 
about the preoccupations guiding social research too. Rather than being 
reactive and probing the overt and obvious, inquiry should aim to 
 cultivate thinking afresh. To do so requires more than asking whether 
this or that topic has been given sufficient regard. Rather, it requires 
inquiring into the conditions that structure what is or is not missing. 
In other words, “how” and not just “what” must be examined, but in 
a way that questions the contingencies and commitments of “how.”
The composition of the chapters in this collection exemplifies this 
imperative to question the priorities of social research while we uti-
lize it to make sense of the world. One long-standing divide in social 
studies of the life sciences has been between those who are concerned 
about ELSA (ethical, legal, and social aspects) or ELSI (ethical, legal, and 
social implications) and those concerned about its security dimensions.4 
Overall, the latter largely has been the purview of those working within 
international relations, peace studies, and security studies, whereas the 
former have become mainstays within sociology, politics, anthropol-
ogy, and ethics. The result has been a weak cross fertilization of ideas. 
In contrast, Absence in Science, Security and Policy seeks to bring together 
security and nonsecurity-related analyses in order to ask how they can 
learn from each other.
This introductory chapter challenges us to think afresh about these 
matters through the following structure: the next section opens up 
what it means to suggest that there is concern or not through unpack-
ing the basic descriptors of absence and presence. As will be contended, 
these two notions are often treated as opposites; however, this distinc-
tion is difficult to sustain. Instead it is necessary to ask how presence 
and absence are interrelated. When this is done, as a dichotomous 
designator, “non-” is likely to be crudely blunt if not downright unhelp-
ful. Answering the question “What is absent?” requires attending to 
questions such as “Absent for whom?,” “When?,” “In what manner?,” 
and “By which practices?.” Contrasts between in-group and out-group, 
front stage and backstage, public and private, as well as official and 
non-official, are just some of the possible starting lines for cleavage. The 
third section also asks to what extent the social and ethical analysis of 
science is absent regard for what is missing from it.
On the basis of a nuanced sense of absence and presence, the fourth 
section then considers what it can mean to talk about “concern” and 
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“non-concerns” as well as the necessary cautions associated with inquir-
ing about them. This discussion, in turn, provides the basis in the fifth 
section for asking what kind of empirical and conceptual sensitivities 
might be needed for this volume.
The tension that runs throughout this chapter is how to handle, on 
the one hand, the desire to question the meaning of notions such as 
“absence,” “presence,” and “(non)-concern” while, on the other hand, 
necessarily trading on a sense of their meaning. Rather than somehow 
seeking to resolve this tension, the intention is to develop sensitivities 
for appreciating what is at stake in order to open up possibilities for 
thought. As part of fostering such sensitivities, this chapter (as with 
the other in Part I) reflects on what new metaphors might guide our 
investigation. I advance the metaphor of the autostereogram in the 
final section as one way of fostering re-appreciations—to create a space 
through attending to absences.
Through its varied preoccupations, this chapter touches on wide-
ranging aspects and literatures. For that reason it will likely demand 
much of the reader. This situation very much exemplifies the topics 
under investigation. The more one opens up to absences the more they 
abound, but the appreciation of their prominence does not leave us 
lesser, but rather richer.
The interweavings of presence and absence
In asking how those groups or individuals attentive to ethical, legal, and 
social implications of science can become more mindful about what 
they are not addressing, the arguments in this volume are infused with 
the descriptors of “absent” and “present.” This section offers an appre-
ciation of the relation between the two. This then provides the basis for 
a nuanced understanding of what it means to describe a topic as (not) 
“of concern” in the next section.
To start, it can be noted that “absence” and “presence” are often 
understood in terms of degrees. If the question is posed: “Is X present?,” 
then the answer need not be only “yes” or “no.” Even if we take that 
question as pertaining to physical perception, the response can be 
“more or less.” Over time all sorts of things—mountains, civilizations, 
ideas—gradually come and go. Perhaps controversially, the existence 
of an individual life itself can be approached as a matter of degree—
with near conception and end-of-life conditions confounding neat 
binary classifications.5 The assertion that everything exists in degrees— 
including “whole” numbers such as 1, 2, 3 … —was a foundational 
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tenet for the fuzzy mathematics that underpins the operation of many 
of our modern adaptive electronic devices.6
In part because of degrees, the relation between the descriptors 
of “absent” and “present” is complex. What is on show often defies 
any simple characterization. The physical world provides numerous 
examples of this. Vacuums may be devoid of substance, but they can 
be pulsating with energy. The chairs on which people write and read 
books generally seem solid enough. At an atomic scale though, they 
are characterized by material emptiness—“99.9999999999999 per cent 
empty space” to be roughly exact.7 At a subatomic scale, the protons 
and neutrons that make up the atomic nucleus are themselves charac-
terized by material emptiness.
Attention to degree can be used to prompt attention to aspect. It might 
well be argued that what counts is not how much “material” is taken up 
by electrons, protons, and neutrons, but rather the sense of substance for 
us generated by the natural forces at work. The application of the term 
“absence” and “presence” then turns on what feature of something is 
deemed relevant. As a result, both terms might be used for description, 
but for different reasons and in multiple ways. Memorial is the activity 
of trying to keep present in thought that which is not proximate for per-
ception. Take another example more closely related to the themes of this 
volume. For those with dementia, Schillmeier has argued that objects in 
the world can be both present and absent. They are present to hand as 
observable things out in the world. And yet, they are only—and merely—
present. With no remembered past relations to those with dementia, 
objects have no future. With no past or future, objects “lead into nothing 
and to nowhere.”8 They are absent of meaning. In these ways, “demented 
objects” can be said to be both present and absent at the same time.
Complexity also derives from the manner in which determinations of 
absence and presence can be relative. That is to say, they are made on the 
basis of comparison. To contend a topic is missing from the 10 o’clock 
news, for instance, involves making a judgment about how much it 
should be covered in the first place. Determinations about whether 
there is silence—that is an absence of noise—depend on expectations of 
what sound there should be. This is not likely to be a matter of universal 
accord and would almost certainly vary by setting. It is the potential 
for conflicting judgments about whether a given something is “there 
enough” that enables individuals to ask what sort of regard should be 
given in the first place.
Absence can imply presence because to be empty is to be empty of 
something; something that was there, should be there, or in the future 
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might again come back. For instance, perhaps starting with Yves Klein’s 
1958 exhibition The Void, a number of contemporary artists have pro-
duced galleries and museums emptied out of traditional works of art. 
The displaying of “empty space”—white walls and bare rooms—where 
there is the anticipation for objects of a certain type has been recurring 
modern motif for provoking debate. The ability of such emptied spaces 
to disturb, bewilder, and anger draws on a sense of what else should be 
present from what else is so.9 Similarly, attempts to sequester away—
such as in erasing secret government sites from maps or removing the 
deceased from places of dying—can create an absence that evokes a 
sense of what is missing.10
An example of how presence can imply absence is given in the interpre-
tations prominent scholars have made of photographs. Rather than the 
photo fixing an immobile moment, it has been interpreted as a trace ever 
haunted by what is outside the frame. As Sontag wrote, “To take a pho-
tograph is to participate in another person’s (or thing’s) morality, vulner-
ability, mutability. Precisely by slicing out this moment and freezing it, 
all photographs testify to time’s relentless melt.”11 What is there, in other 
words, points away from itself to that which is no longer so. The philoso-
pher Noë discussed the pictorial presence of the photos as making the 
people present precisely as otherwise absent.12 Informed by psychoanaly-
sis, Leader has contended art in general evokes a sense of what is beyond 
representation.13 Still more widely, for some such as Franke, presence 
as absence is ubiquitous aspect of language when it is maintained that 
“All that is said, at least indirectly and implicitly, testifying to something 
else that is not said and perhaps cannot be said.”14 Derrida has perhaps 
been the most influential intellectual in advancing the notion that the 
meaning of words should be seen as in the negative; that is to say, terms 
take their specific meaning from the possible range of meanings they are 
not. His work has served as the inspiration for many attempts to under-
stand how absence implies presence and presence absence.15
The two terms are also relational when the meaning and significance 
of what is absent depends on what is present and vice versa.16 In 
terms of the former, when only a few lines of text are blacked out in 
documents released as part of a Freedom of Information request, the 
resulting “holes” on the page can become pregnant with significance.17 
Depending on the surrounding notes, in music the lack of sound at 
any specific moment might be either deemed a “silence” that should be 
recognized as meaningful (or even “itself” heard18) or just a passing lull 
that gives way to the next note. As well, depending on the surrounding 
words and situation, in an interview the lack of spoken words at any 
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specific moment might be either deemed a noteworthy gap or momen-
tary happenstance.19 These examples suggest how absence figures in our 
lived experiences.20
In terms of how presences take their meaning from absences, con-
sider two examples. When military intelligence is communicated in the 
public domain—as in the now infamous February 5, 2003 presentation 
by US Secretary of State Colin Powell to UN Security Council on “Iraqi 
WMD”—then what is shown can take on an inflated status for those 
that assume it must only be the tip of the intelligence iceberg. Some 
maintained that this would be so because authorities would prudently 
hold some evidence back from the public gaze.21 Likewise, in relation to 
commercial confidentiality, the explicit withholding of some data from 
view or the presentation of overtly manipulated data can work to sug-
gest much unstated expertise lies beyond the partial information made 
visible.22 Meyer’s call to develop a “relational ontology of absence” draws 
attention to the need to attend to the two-way relationality between 
absence and presence in material culture.23 Graves, museums, memora-
bilia are some of the forms of materiality that signal immateriality.
Relationality can entail dependency. A room in a building is as much 
defined by what is there in some obvious material sense (supporting 
beams, plaster boards, bricks) as what is not (the empty space enclosed). 
The latter gives a room the room which can be occupied. Without that 
potential, it is not a room. Within the unfolding, moment-to-moment 
interactions of conversations, the importance of silence and talk can 
be reliant on one another. The meaning of these both is shaped by 
situational expectations and they help constitute those interactions as 
particular kinds of situations (ordinary conversation, professional talk, 
office banter).24 The classic Chinese text Tao Te Ching is a multifacet 
engagement with that which remains beyond the bounds of expression. 
It also includes consideration of how what not is present is constitutive 
of what is so. A direct reference to the dependency of what is there on 
what is not is given in the passage:
Thirty spokes meet at a nave;
Because of the hole we may use the wheel.
Clay is molded into a vessel;
Because of the hollow we may use the cup.
Walls are built around a hearth;
Because of the doors we may use the house.
Thus tools come from what exists,
But use from what does not.25
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Many different sorts of objects—bells, flames, art museums, mur-
der mysteries—require some bounding of and dependency between 
absences and presences to give them function.26 But note the absences, 
gaps, and spaces in-between are not simply a state of nothing or some 
blank void. It is the air in the bell that enables sound to ring out. In 
a nontrivial way, a bell is not a bell without the “emptiness” its form 
envelops.
Absence and presence can exist in relations of causality. Presences that 
lead to absences are commonplace. Too much of the hormone dihy-
drotestosterone on the scalp can result in the absence of hair. To talk of 
absence that cause presence is commonplace too. The absence of rain 
can be said to be the cause of a bush fire. The lack of exposure to the sun 
can result in Vitamin D deficiency which, in turn, causes bone deformi-
ties and so on. While often taken for granted in everyday talk, the 
standing of such “negative causality” can be a matter of dispute. To say 
that a famine is caused by the absence of international aid, for instance, 
might upset some sensitivities. Like so many of the issues about how to 
blend absence and presence in this chapter, the appropriateness of the 
characterization depends on the purposes at hand.
Efforts to make present are also invariably bound up with the produc-
tion of absence: Disclosures about the world always have an end, and 
so any description necessarily creates a sense of that which remains 
outside of it. For some topics—such as the historical analysis of daily 
cultural life—what can be appreciated through the remaining documen-
tary evidence signals the vast terrain of what remains unappreciable 
because it has been lost in time.27 In this respect, seeing is a way of not 
seeing because of what gets left out of the picture formed. As well, what 
is stated provides the very terms that can be further elaborated. More 
words provide more commentary, but they also mark a terrain that 
could be scrutinized for what remains outside of what is given.
Inquiry and absence
Despite noting these varied interweavings of what is there and what is 
not, Absence in Science, Security and Policy ever hazards collapsing into 
a superficial employment of the designation “absent.” This stems from 
the basic demand associated with the underlying justification for this 
volume: attending to what is missing and absent.
Elsewhere, others have argued too that there has been insufficient 
regard for what is absent compared to what is present.28 In a special 
volume of Social Epistemology on absence, Frickel contended that the 
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field of Science and Technology Studies (STS) is dominated by “knowl-
edge making, not the non-production of knowledge; our accounts typi-
cally privilege action over inaction; we study processes of becoming, or 
emergence, far more than processes of winnowing or submergence; 
we are more interested in beginnings and successes than endings and 
failures.”29 Similar apprehensions have been expressed about how fields 
such as bioethics are typically directed toward the dissection of mani-
fested binds and dilemmas.30
While such observations can be valid for the purposes they were 
offered, what is demanded at other times though is the need for con-
siderable caution in treating the label of absent as simply indicating 
some void or lack. Instead of asking whether something is there, it is 
necessary to ask how absence implicates presence and vice versa. In this 
regard, for instance, despite the justifications for the evaluations made 
in the previous paragraph, it is possible to advance a less stark reading 
of STS and bioethics: that through their persistent flagging of the con-
tingency of knowledge production and ethical decision-making, both (if 
only implicitly and indirectly) continually point to what remains in the 
shadows. For instance, understanding how certain forms of expertise 
become dominant and institutionalized simultaneously speaks to what 
gets marginalized and how.31 Likewise in International Relations, regard 
for the contingent process of how security problems are identified—as 
in securitization theory—speaks to what is not.32
Going a step further though, it is possible to note that notions of 
absence and presence within academic literature exist in a dynamic 
relation with one another. For instance, in the desire to give a voice to 
experiences marginalized by mainstream culture, many of those who 
studied “race” and ethnicity in the past in the West did so by casting 
attention toward “the Other.” What was insufficiently acknowledged 
could then be acknowledged—what was hitherto absent could be made 
present. As has become more widely accepted though, this move itself 
produced an unquestioned domain: that of the presumed (white) Self. 
In more recent decades, anti-racist scholarship has expressly turned 
to the cultural production of concepts of “whiteness.” In attending to 
how these often unacknowledged but pervasive collective identifica-
tions are formed, these studies seek to question the conventions of both 
social life and social science.33 Similarly, Brekhus offered a generalized 
approach for querying the implications of what is off the agenda in 
his call for the study of the mundane.34 As he contended, all too often 
social researchers are attracted to the “extraordinary.” This not only 
results in areas being un-investigated, it leads to “marked” topics being 
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treated as more distinct, exaggerated, and yet also more uniform than 
would be otherwise.
Taking the previous paragraphs together suggests two points: (i) easy 
generalizations of absence in academic disciplines can belie what 
has been made present; (ii) attempts to make present can lead to the 
 production of absences.
These dynamics play out in contemporary discussions about igno-
rance. In recent years, across various disciplines renewed calls have 
been made for its examination. As part of this, what is deemed 
“unknown” should not be conceived as blank space that results from 
some inability to know. Instead, ignorance can be deliberately manu-
factured, actively sought, or it can serve as a prompt for learning.35 
‘Leading advocates of the turn to ignorance, such as Proctor, have 
contended that ignorance has fared as the poor cousin to knowledge. 
He advanced the notion of “agnotology” to complement the long-
standing field of epistemology.36
Yet, despite the ways in which ignorance has been positioned as 
previously absent in academic study, it is possible to offer other inter-
pretations. One way this could be done is through employing a more 
nuanced sense of what has been made present. We might, for instance, 
note the ways in which previous research has again and again provided 
analysis that speaks to ignorance; albeit perhaps not necessarily under 
that particular label.37 Croissant, for instance, surveyed a wide range of 
scholarship undertaken across a number of decades that investigated 
the creation of “agnosis”; including the sociology of risk, political 
studies of ideology, postcolonical studies, and critical race studies.38 
Whether such studies are treated as informing an understanding of 
ignorance proper is highly consequential. This informs determinations 
about both the extent of current “knowledge gaps” as well as what is 
required to address them.
Another way to resist a simple characterization of the absence of the 
study of ignorance is to ask how evaluations made to this effect are the 
results of ongoing academic specialization. For instance, at least some 
discussions about ignorance within anthropology appear to neither 
be informed by or to inform related discussions in other disciplines.39 
To the extent that the formation of academic specialisms means that 
researchers know more and more about less and less, then it needs to 
be appreciated that the disciplinary structure of academia itself acts as 
an engine for fostering ignorance.40
The mapping provided in this section whereby what is absent melds 
and mixes with what is present indicates the type of receptiveness 
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needed in asking what issues associated with science are “not of 
concern” and how. While “absent” and “present” are adjectives and 
“presence” and “absence” nouns, understanding how these designa-
tions matter for the study of social life entails the study of verbs. The 
goal then is not to posit a new kind of object (i.e., absent ones) that is 
attributed as doing things in the world; akin to physicists identifying 
dark matter as central to the composition of the universe.41 Absence 
and presence are taken to signal dynamic processes between knower 
and known that can have considerable implications: some individuals 
will be cast as experts, others skilful enough to be able to discern what 
is missing, and others not able to see what is in front of them. As a 
result, the active processes under examination should be understood as 
consequential for how both the subjects and objects of concern become 
conceived.
What the chapters of Absence in Science, Security and Policy seek 
to avoid then is treating presence and absence as distinct states, 
wherein the contributors then assume the role of knowledge hole-
fillers. Rather, notions of absence and presence are dynamically 
intertwined. Elsewhere, I forwarded the metaphor of a “whirlwind” 
to characterize how absence and presence interact with the writings 
of social research.42 Vortexes such as whirlwinds take their shape 
from the interactive movement between what is there and what is 
not—meaning what is absent cannot be defined without reference 
to what is present. In addition, it is the interaction of the two that 
accounts for the emergent forces set in motion by vortices. What the 
“whirlwind” metaphor does not acknowledge though is the relation 
of absence and presence to the observer. New metaphors are vital in 
order to refrain from crude but commonplace orientations—a point 
revisited below.
Attentive to the dynamisms of the melding and mixing, the contribu-
tors in this volume treat the manifestation of societal concern about 
science as secured, mediated, diminished, threatened, and sustained 
through potentially complex movements of what might be called “pres-
encing” and “absencing.” A goal of the remainder of this Introduction is 
to trace out how concern can be made into a topic of study, while also 
attending to what remains outside this or any analysis.
The interweavings of concern and nonconcern
While the previous section opened up the understanding of “absence,” 
this one turns to a related term in the title for this book: concern. 
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Building on the previous argument, it asks what it means to speak about 
the absence of apprehension as well as how such situations could figure 
a topic for study.
As with absence, it is possible to advance a complex, somewhat Janus, 
picture of the treatment of (non-) concerns with the social sciences 
and other domains of study. While disciplines such as sociology and 
international relations are generally drawn toward matters that animate 
debate and interest, what does not so has also figured as an implicit 
topic of commentary.43 The “social problems” and “social movements” 
literatures are ones where this is perhaps most clearly evident. In seek-
ing to understand how certain topics become deemed “problems” that 
mobilize action, these fields constantly gesture toward what does not 
get deemed a problem and what does not mobilize action.
For those analysts wishing to examine what doesn’t become a con-
cern and for whom, one way the existing literature could be reinter-
preted to inform to the issues of this volume is by reversing the lines 
of sight presented. Analysis of the establishment of the priorities in 
an international disarmament NGO (it campaigns on a, b, c) could 
be taken as indicating what isn’t of concern (x, y, z). The reason why 
topic x isn’t recognized then is the lack of the factors that lead to the 
prioritization of a, b, c. Further, the lack of recognition of x need not 
even be regarded as problematic. Time and resource constraints might 
make such marginalization essential. Treated in the manner outlined 
above, absent concerns would be derived as leftovers. Herein, appreci-
ating what is not requires little more of social analysis than learning 
to subtract.
Yet it seems highly plausible to argue that the task of examining con-
cerns is more demanding than this.44 A particular matter might be hard 
to grasp, deliberately concealed, too mundane to be appreciated, pur-
posely not made public, unintelligible, too foregrounded to be noticed, 
collectively disowned, lost in history, beyond expression, or barred from 
comprehension.45 Each of these calls for subtlety in investigation. As 
well, in de-anchoring analysis from something overt to something not 
so, in the study of what is not of concern the range of possibly relevant 
considerations multiplies dramatically. And since those considerations 
relate to what is not taking place, evidencing their counterfactual rel-
evance is not straightforward. Stated differently, what needs attention is 
not simply this or that missing recognition. Instead it may be necessary 
to attend to discourses, “worldviews,” paradigms, assumptions, forms 
of power, modes of (un)knowing, and so on, that precondition what is 
possible for individuals or groups.46
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Past strategies employed in explicit efforts to identify “non-concerns” 
have included comparing topics with shared pertinent similarities in 
order to account for variations in how they are recognized, evaluated, 
and acted upon; forwarding normative principles to query conventions; 
probing struggles for appropriate language; using extreme cases of activ-
ity to identify inactivity; undertaking historical study to signal counter-
factuals and counter-scenarios; utilizing quantitative research methods 
and noncooperative game theory to indicate possibilities beyond those 
that are most often manifest; and engaging in structural analysis to 
identify unacknowledged matters.47
With respect to science as specific topic, many studies speaking to the 
nullifying of concerns have investigated the practices of professional 
boundary work. For instance, Cunningham-Burley and Kerr examined 
how the accounts of geneticists enabled them to secure the cognitive 
authority necessary to secure public research funding, while placing 
themselves as authority figures about the social implications of genetics, 
while also distancing themselves from the responsibility for negative 
dimensions.48 Firth and colleagues examined boundary work within 
infertility clinics that meant ethical concerns were not identified with 
its day-to-day practices.49
Inquiry and concern 
As suggested in the previous argument then, it is not only the “non-
concerns” of those under study that need attention, but of those doing 
the study—social analysts, researchers, scholars, practitioners, and so 
on. As such, some have argued that empirical investigation undertaken 
with an eye on what is judged to be absent as a concern helps produce 
more robust analysis. It does so by fostering alternative hypotheses, set-
ting out strategic agendas, avoiding reactivity, and encouraging regard 
to negative evidence.50 For instance, the academic literature into “social 
problems” and “social movements” is extensive. Yet, without systematic 
consideration directed toward what does not become a concern, this 
literature hazards are becoming conservative.51 The scope for apprehen-
sion with the limitations of the empirical is substantial; it extends far 
beyond the personal commitments of individual investigators.52 Social 
research is undertaken in circumstances that lead to the lack of recogni-
tion of some matters that, in turn, helps reproduce conditions of selec-
tive regard. Formal constraints on what can be studied, the structures of 
research organizations, the peculiarities of funding agencies, and profes-
sional expectations about what is worth knowing are just some of the 
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factors that delimit attention.53 Raising further apprehension, Rayner 
argues that some social research has had the effect of diverting and dis-
tracting societal and professional regard; resulting in certain matters not 
being acknowledged and some possibilities never being considered.54
Any descriptions of social “implications,” “troubles,” and so on 
necessarily provide selective and partial simplifications.55 In this they 
frame what is going on and why, as well as prefigure what needs doing 
and by whom through what description is included and what they do 
not include. The framing of issues is as pervasive and inevitable as it is 
disputable and contingent. The contingency and commitments of any 
descriptions especially come to the fore when it is looked at in terms of 
what it does not include. As such, engaging with the demands and dilem-
mas of seeking to bring absent concerns front and center can be one way 
of engaging with the general conditions of analysis front and center.56
More than this though, descriptions are consequential. The very 
procedures and routines designed to address ethical concerns can effec-
tively render them unrecognized. To study patient care dilemmas in 
hospitals as matters of “ethics” can reinforce relations of hierarchy that 
result in the worries of some not being aired.57
Another possible benefit is that novel questions can be posed. This is 
so when attending to what is absent leads to critical reflection on the 
preoccupations and predilections of social actors and researchers. For 
instance, that might mean asking questions such as the following:
How do procedures meant to identify issues stymie regarding them as 
a concern?
In what ways can empirical research distract, divert, and delay recogni-
tion and action?
How is “what counts as data” the effects of and how does it affect exist-
ing social practices, networks, and routines?
What research has gone undone? On whose behalf is it meant to be 
done?
Why are things not otherwise?
In the ways outlined above, empirical social research can be part of the 
reasons why some matters are rendered unrecognized, not a concern, 
not worth acting upon, and so on. In the effort to study what is absent 
then, the status quo, and what foils efforts to move on from it demand 
consideration. To do this almost certainly requires looking beyond a 
single policy or decision. What it ultimately requires by way of investi-
gation though is an open matter.
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Many of the issues raised in this section played out in classical argu-
ments between pluralist and post-pluralist theories about the exercise 
of power centered on whether it was possible to study what did not 
happen—what did not get on the agenda58 or what demands were never 
formulated in the first place. As a project of making present what was 
absent, post-pluralists sought to move beyond visible political contests. 
In this way, it was possible to propose otherwise hidden relations of 
domination and subordination. This identification provided a basis for 
questioning what was not happening in political life as well as what was 
not happening in the study of political life.59
Making a case for what is sidelined through power though raised 
thorny issues about how analysts are positioned. For instance, 
Stephen Lukes’s classic book Power: A Radical View60 set out a strategy 
for assessing why certain wants, preferences, and grievances never 
formed in the first place. The job of the social analyst herein was that 
of an expert who sought to identify what was latent. Because it was 
latent, simply relying on interviews or surveys with members of the 
public would not be sufficient. Instead, analysts had to marshal an 
argument for being able to recognize about others what they might 
well not recognize about themselves. That meant at times relying 
on individuals’ reports about their grievances, but also at times 
pointing to individual’s actual or real interests. In this way, marking 
the absence of concern then was irrevocably tied to the making of 
authority. Thinking more widely, arguments about what has been 
disclosed through academic analysis, who is (really) capable of com-
prehending it, and to what extent it is distinct from everyday thought 
are all part and parcel of how many academics claim expertise.61 
Since the time of Power: A Radical View’s initial publication in the 
mid-1970s, the project of explaining what is not happening has been 
more tentative and complicated because of doubts about whether 
“real interests” exist, and even if they do, whether social scientists 
can determine them.62
The identification of the “real” that can serve as a foothold for analysis 
is a feature of many studies orientated toward the “not.” Dimitrov, for 
instance, asked why only some international environmental concerns 
led to the creation of corresponding interstate policy agreements.63 His 
explanation centered on the extent of substantive information about 
the consequences of environmental concerns; in particular, information 
about their transnational boundary effects. Accounting for action and 
inaction in this way though relied on judgments made about the factual 
status of the problems with forest and coral reef degradation.
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Within the “social problems” tradition, anxiety has long been 
expressed about how social researchers can end up clandestinely 
importing in assumptions about the nature of the problems they are 
addressing. When the goal of this tradition was widely taken as the real-
ist identification of neglected concerns that merited greater apprecia-
tion, then a sense of the facts of the matter was central to the enterprise. 
Some claims about the world might be critiqued, but others need to be 
taken for granted to advance some sense of the problem. More gener-
ally within social research, questions can always be asked about what 
has been left out of attempts to understand why certain matters have 
not merited regard.64
Within the constructivist turn in recent decades in social problems, 
the orientation has been to treat the meaning attributed to problems 
as the contingent result of the activities of individuals and groups. 
The emphasis is with “claims making” rather than “making claims.” 
And yet, as Woolgar and Pawluch contended, notionally constructivist 
forms of analysis utilize selective questioning in the manner in which 
they often take it as their role to explain the indefinite relation between 
shifting accounts of a problem and some underlying (real) situation.65 
Any understanding of the latter though is necessarily as crafted by ana-
lysts as other accounts. As such, un-interrogated and un-acknowledged 
footholds end up propping up constructivist arguments about the 
actual state of underlying situations.
More recently, Latour has questioned the ever unpacking of facts as 
it is typically conceived in social theorizing. As he argues, usually the 
goal of theorizing is one of unearthing, exposing, revealing, and so on, 
the social basis for notionally objectified factual claims. In short, inces-
sant deconstruction is the mission—at least, that is of deconstruction of 
other people’s facts. The ones cherished by analysts are often excluded 
from this kind of scrutiny. In its place he proposes a kind of realist ori-
entation to “matters of concern.”66 The shift could be characterized as a 
movement from soulless deconstructivism to positive constructivism—
a shift from critique as typically conceived since Immanuel Kant to the 
attempts to understand the materially heterogeneous assemblages that 
enable the liveliness of things to emerge, be maintained, and move 
individuals. Responding to Latour, Lynch has argued that instead of 
starting with “matters of concern” as a framing category, it would be 
more advantageous to see how, by whom, for whom, and so on, con-
cerns about science and technology are made relevant and contested.67 
It is the latter approach of asking what counts and how so as a concern 
that is aligned with many of the chapters of this volume.
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Possible approaches
The previous argument would suggest that knowing what is not of con-
cern can be tricky. In the manner that partiality is a constitutive part of 
seeing, it is unwise to approach the study of what is absent through simply 
trying to peer more intently or to strive to get below the surface of appear-
ance. It would also seem questionable to just change our direction of 
view or redouble our efforts to gather facts. Arguably, the demands 
of identifying what is not of concern by some metric should not be 
regarded as containable through a particular technique or method. 
Since the method entails the mobilization of bias, it invariably creates 
a sense of the missing. Also, the desire to regard what was hitherto not 
regarded comes with its own tempting allures that need to be avoided. 
For instance, the belief that this can be done in some authoritative 
fashion can lead to clinging to some ways of understanding as definite.
The complicit and self-referential dynamics at work suggest the 
necessity for heightened sensitivities rather than set solutions. Those 
include the need to (i) disrupt taken-for-granted ways of understand-
ing; (ii) become curious about how to marshal claims about empirical 
facts; (iii) inquire how we relate to our objects of study; and (iv) ask 
how opportunities for knowing are enabled and constricted because of 
the qualities of the object of study and our methods for studying them. 
Such sensitivities require becoming attentive to tensions: How can 
there be any easy sense of knowing what is not being avoided while also 
commenting on what is lacking? How can concentration on specific 
topics be combined with a sensitivity about what is outside of them? 
When can the demand to attend to what is not being attended to cease?
In the spirit that underlies this Introduction, in posing these ques-
tions it is important to recognize that much valuable thought has 
already been dedicated around these types of sensitivities. One way of 
dealing with the demands above is to seek modest, situated truth claims 
that attend to the question “For what?” “Nons” can be identified for a 
specific purpose rather than for all seasons. That is to say, it is possible 
to rethink the purpose of study. Taken in a Deweyan pragmatic sense, 
rather than trying to decisively determine what is absent, for who, and 
how, effort can be directed toward establishing experimental forms of 
inquiry that can foster questioning, learning, and dialogue.68 In other 
words, research needs to be approached as a process—a form of inter-
vention—one, for Dewey, that took problematic situations as its object 
of attention. This emphasis on the question of understanding “For 
what?” contrasts with the typical goal of achieving some generalized 
understanding of the world—a goal expressed in such diverse pursuits 
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as the explanation of power as well as actor network theory inspired 
delineations of “matters of concerns.”69
Another approach to thinking about the types of sensitivities help-
ful for the themes of this book is given in Maria Puig de la Bellacasa’s 
reorientation of Latour’s “matters of concern” into “matters of care.”70 
The latter locates itself within a tradition of regard to affective states of 
attachment, commitment, and practice. Such a reframing places at the 
forefront what has been neglected—such as devalued forms of labor 
or activities defined as superfluous. This is done in order to engender 
practices of care that can, in turn, lead to novel forms of understand-
ing.71 That is to say, Puig de la Bellacasa makes the case for rethinking 
the motivations for study when she argues:
[i]n strongly stratified technoscientific worlds, erased concerns do 
not just become visible by following the articulate and assembled 
concerns composing a thing, nor does generating care happen by 
counting the participants present in an issue. In the perspective 
proposed here, generating care means counting in participants 
and issues who have not managed or are not likely to succeed in 
articulating their concerns, or whose modes of articulation indi-
cate a politics that is “imperceptible” within prevalent ways of 
understanding….72
Herein, it is necessary to ask about the effects of theorizations. This 
task of asking what effort makes something neglected has been pursued 
elsewhere too. For instance, Bacchi provides a sustained analysis of how 
problems affecting women are identified and how they are evaluated 
with particular emphasis on the consequences of what is not problema-
tized and what possibilities for actions do not arise.73
Alternative sensitivities can be promoted through unorthodox ways 
of asking “What’s there?” That is to say, it is possible to rethink the 
objects of study. Law and Lien outline two contrasting ways of making 
sense of this question with broadly constructivist approaches to science 
and technology:
On the one hand [some suggest] that since different groups have dif-
ferent locations and social and material interests, it is unsurprising 
that they also have different perspectives. This social constructivist 
way of thinking is grounded, at least implicitly, on the assumption 
that the cosmos is endowed with a single order (for instance a single 
social structure, or a single material world).74
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and then on the other hand there can be a focus:
on practices rather than people or groups, […] avoid[ing] assuming 
that there is a grounding order. Instead they say that practices gen-
erate orders. Ordering becomes a relational and performative effect 
of practices, and since the latter vary, this also means that ordering 
varies too. As a result, questions of ontology (the kinds of objects or 
entities that exist) are detached from general assumptions about the 
character of the cosmos and become a matter for empirical investi-
gation. At the same time, the cosmos turns from a general framing 
order into contingent sets of orders, ordering processes, disorders, 
and unknowable fluidities.75
In the latter treatment favored by Law and Lien, it is not simply that 
some same object is conceived of in different ways by different groups 
in society, but rather that it is necessary to ask how different objects 
come to be through different practices.76 Such contrasting ontological 
presumptions lend themselves to different ways of thinking about how 
matters are rendered missing, how to characterize the concerns associ-
ated with them, and what research design is appropriate.77
Sensitivities
In trying to heighten sensitivities for attending to what is absent, the 
remainder of this chapter turns attention elsewhere. I want to examine 
some of the base assumptions often made about how social research 
sizes up the objects of its study. In doing so, the goal is to rethink the 
relations of our studies and through doing so nurture new possibilities.
A joke might help bring some issues into relief:
A woman comes across someone kneeling on the pavement 
under street lamp.
“Are you alright?,” she asks.
“I’ve dropped my house keys,” he explains.
After several minutes of searching together, she asks “Where 
exactly do you think you dropped them?”
“Somewhere over there I think,” he says pointing down the 
street.
Perplexed, she asks “Then why are we looking here?”
“Because this is where the light is.”
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The “Streetlight Effect” joke trades on the readily understandable desire 
to find something missing. The final line revealing the search is being 
conducted around the ease of hunting due to the location of the light, 
rather than the likelihood of finding due to the location of keys, renders 
the search farcical.
The Streetlight Effect though is often recounted for more than gener-
ating laughter. Instead it can function as parable. The manner in which 
the presence of light directs attention serves as an analogy for how the 
availability of certain techniques, tools, and models affect what gets 
known and what does not. For instance, with “economist” substituted 
for “man,” the story becomes a timely warning about the self-induced 
blind spots of a profession.78 The joke has served as a warning of the 
disastrous consequences of how the ease of measuring certain effects 
(e.g., short-term indicators for tumor shrinkage) over others (long-term 
survival rates for patients) skews medicine.79 These are themes central 
to Absence in Science, Security and Policy. Both in terms of social life and 
social research, ignorance and absence can result from attention being 
directed here rather than there.
What I want to focus on in particular though is how this lesson about 
“blinders” relies on a visual metaphor. Depending on exactly how it is 
told, in this joke, light represents knowledge or at least the means to it. 
As such, while serving as a guard against the bounds of what is known, 
the Streetlight Effect joke does so through one way of sensing the world.
The association of the visual with knowledge (in preference to other 
senses) is arguably widespread in Western thought and scholarship.80 
As some examples, the rise of reason over doctrine that began in 
seventeenth-century Europe is termed “Enlightenment.” Words like 
“observe,” “reflection,” and “field” permeate the language of scholar-
ship, as they have permeated this chapter. Striving for transparency—
shining a light into dark corners—is a way of rendering something 
knowable because to enable something to be visible is to make it com-
prehendible. It can be counted, described, gotten the measure of, and 
so on. Seeing is even said to be believing. Contrarily, when one’s view 
is obscured, when objects are hidden, or when one is kept in the dark 
then “insight” is diminished.
Seeing and sight, in turn, are aligned with certain manners of concep-
tualizing the objects being viewed. Objects become conceived in terms 
of surface and depth, size and volume, as well as interior and exterior. 
The task of viewing is one of exposing things to light or moving some 
from the background to the foreground.
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The reliance on a visual metaphor then is contingent and consequen-
tial. It favors particular ways of conceiving what is at stake.
At this point in the argument, one way to proceed would be to switch 
sense doors. Instead of sticking with sight, the argument could turn 
to examining how thinking with metaphors for touch, taste, hearing, 
and smell could offer by way of new sensitivities. This is not the course 
that will be followed. Instead, I want to keep with the dominant visual 
metaphor.
The basis for this continuing engagement is the recognition that 
sight is limited as an underlying metaphor because conventional ways 
of thinking about seeing only partly cover what takes place in seeing. 
Staying with this recognition is the basis for seeking new possibilities.81
In relation to the physical world, seeing is not simply about perceiv-
ing what there is. Given the vast distances of space, a look up in the 
night’s sky will make visible many objects which no longer exist in an 
ordinary sense.82 Zoom in to the stars and other complications arise. 
Black spots are clearly visible on images of the Sun. These do not indi-
cate the absence of light. Rather it is the contrast with the surroundings 
that makes these brilliantly radiant areas dark. Rainbows appear in the 
sky, but to take that appearance as indicating they possess substance 
akin to other visible objects would be a mistake. Alternatively, that 
which is not visible can still be perceptually present, as in looking at a 
tomato, a book, a piece of furniture, and so on. We can in some mean-
ingful way sense the backs of such objects even if they are occluded 
from view.83 Additionally, we don’t perceive everything that is visible 
because there is simply too much to take in with any viewing. This text 
is being seen by you as the reader, but not simply the whole book in 
its totality at once.84 Instead, focus is directed, and focus is partiality 
by definition. And finally, too much light can be blinding.85 As a result 
of the sort of points, the conflation of the visible, the present, and the 
known is problematic.
Acknowledging the potential and the limitations of knowing as see-
ing, I want to ask what kind of alternative metaphors for the work of 
seeing might be helpful in attending to the absence of concern. Is there 
a guiding metaphor or analogous example that might sharpen the sense 
of what is required to examine how implications of science and technol-
ogy are and are not constituted?
This chapter advances a way of seeing relating to autostereograms. 
Autostereograms were popularized in the 1990s through books such 
as the Magic Eye series. These consist of two-dimensional repeating 
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patterns that, when viewed in a certain manner, enable a three-dimen-
sional image to become seen: a car, a flower, a complex geometrical 
shape. Often referred to as a trick of the eye, autostereograms rely on 
the difficulty of the brain in matching together the images of repeating 
patterns received by each eye. By matching certain parts of the image 
together that would not normally be matched, a three-dimensional 
image with depth appears.
As an object, that three-dimensional image has intriguing status in 
relation to the themes of this volume. It is both there and not. The 
image—for instance a flower with an intricate weaving of petals—is 
both there in the sense of having been intentionally inscribed by a ste-
reogram artist as well as not there in the sense of not being immediately 
visible in the patterning. As many viewers of Magic Eye experience, this 
ambiguity fosters curiosity. Seeing a three-dimensional flower where 
there was before nothing of the sort lends itself to wonder about what 
is being seen and how this is so.
Also in terms of its object status, popularized accounts of autostereo-
grams often tend to treat what is relieved as one fixed thing.86 Herein 
there is the surface-viewing available to all those with able sight and the 
hidden picture that can be discerned by those skilled in how to look. 
But viewing an autostereogram is not simply seeing a given uniform 
something. For instance, images can come (and go) in varying ways. 
Initially a single line or an edge of something might be perceived. This 
presents its own picture. Eventually, or maybe, the mind grasps hold 
and solidifies the movements of focus and haziness into a conventional 
image—like a flower—that can be named and this rendered familiar. 
However, in the process of viewing an autostereogram, recognition and 
labeling can be appreciated as an achievement (rather than an auto-
matic capability). The work of seeing is detectable in the relatively slow 
formation of the images. What image does come into view depends on 
the viewer as well. Interestingly once an image solidifies, it is then possi-
ble to make minor bends and tilts in the viewing surface so as to modify 
what is being seen. As well, what is seen is not simply the object the ste-
reogram artist hid inside the repeating pattern. The object perceived is 
constituted by the merger of the (typically colorful and vibrant) surface 
patterning and the hidden image. The two together impart a lucid qual-
ity to what is viewed that often means that an autostereogram looks 
more vivid and sharper than what is seen conventionally.
I am not primarily interested in the object status of an autostereogram 
in terms of its metaphorical potential though. Rather, I want to think 
about what the practice of construing the image signals for the relations 
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to objects of study. Seeing an autostereogram might be a trick of the eye, 
but it is so in two meanings of the word “trick”: a scheme that fosters an 
“illusion,” but also a skilful feat of doing. It is not possible just to focus 
as one typically does (as in reading this text) to see a three-dimensional 
image. One will not appear by intently peering either. Neither would 
one appear by looking at the back pages of a Magic Eye book for the key 
of what is hidden and then trying to somehow find the image camou-
flaged within the repeating pattern. Instead, seeing requires disrupting 
habits. Methods of observation need to be learned and employed, meth-
ods that both enable new ways of viewing while they displace others.87
Common techniques include holding the autostereogram close, 
attempting to look through it, and then gradually moving it away. 
Another is to look through an object nearby and then to slowly place 
the autostereogram within your line of sight. A shared feature of many 
methods though is the need to cultivate a relaxed but at the same 
time attentive gaze. Attempts to intentionally focus on an emerging 
image will take it out of view. Tensing up is likewise counterproductive. 
Instead one needs to train receptiveness to the shifting movements 
within one’s vision. That cannot be forced, but it does not come about 
by idle looking either. If the viewer is able to receptively stay with their 
unfolding experience in a manner that opens up to it, it is possibly to 
perceive new phenomenon.
Purposely cultivating ways of opening up (rather than grasping on) 
to the objects of study is a central theme of the chapters in Absence in 
Science, Security and Policy. For instance, in the other chapter of Part I, 
Brian Balmer offers other strategies for skilfully becoming aware. In “An 
Open Day for Secrets” Brian Balmer employs the notion of steganogra-
phy from cryptography—how objects can be hidden in plain sight—to 
question ignorances and uncertainties associated with the (potentially 
malign) applications of science. Through investigating how concerns 
with the applications of science were handled within the history of the 
UK biological warfare program while also attending to the demands of 
such an investigation, his chapter will develop a contention made by 
Balmer elsewhere. Namely, that the process of assembling a historical 
narrative from declassified documents itself constructs transparency, 
resulting in a narrative made of fragments but which “reads as if it is 
an open window on past events.”88 His close examination of the first 
open day at Britain’s main biological defense establishment, suggests 
how matters are kept secret by drawing attention to their very secrecy. 
As well as being told what they would see, visitors were told what they 
would not see.
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Other contributors to this volume are likewise acting in a manner 
analogous to the requirements of seeing autostereogram: disrupting 
habitual ways of looking, questioning what has been grasped and not, 
and attending to the qualities of the objects of study as shaped by our 
methods for attention. In Part II, “Practices of Inattention,” a number 
of cases are detailed whereby implications of science and technology are 
rendered nonconcerns while the authors also consider what this means 
for inquiry. In “What ELSA Makes Small in Nanomedicine” Michael 
Schillmeier examines how the framing of the implications of engaging 
with nanomedicine through the lens of ELSA results in some gaining 
salience and others not. In response to the humanist understanding 
of politics, the social, and society implicit within ELSA frameworks he 
argues that a “more-than-human” approach is vital in understanding 
and assessing nano-scaled medical innovations. He outlines recent 
theorizing in STS to signal the many possibilities for such an approach.
Drawing on his long-time work experience in the UK Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office, John Walker’s chapter (“Missing the Obvious—
Coping with Scientific and Technological Change in Chemical and 
Biological Weapons Arms Control”) considers how the international 
treaties prohibiting biological and chemical weapons have tried to 
anticipate the implication of scientific and technological change for 
treaty provisions. That has meant trying to grasp what is seemingly 
hard to understand, unknown, unintelligible, collectively disowned, 
nonobvious, or simply beyond expression. It also constitutes absence as 
temporally bound, as he asks how the original negotiators of the treaty 
dealt with future developments that could only be foreseen in very 
vague ways such as science changes, geo-politics changes.
Felicity Mellor’s “Non-news Values in Science Journalism” asks how 
certain implications of science never figure within news coverage. She 
does so by questioning conventional ways of thinking within media 
studies and practicing science journalism. More specifically, Mellor 
argues how “non-news values” particular to science structure what is 
included and omitted from science reporting. These nonnews values 
derive from highly idealist views of science, which themselves construe 
questions of interests and fallibility as nonissues.
In “Project Jefferson: Technological Surprises and Critical Omissions,” 
Kathleen Vogel questions how the US Department of Defense mul-
timillion-dollar-funded “Project Jefferson” tried to assess emerging 
bioweapons threats. Vogel details not only what it was designed to do, 
but also what important omissions resulted from its design and imple-
mentation. She argues that the Project’s focus on technical aspects of 
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bioweapons threats drew intelligence attention from a broader array of 
ways to conceptualize the nature of threats—for instance by attending 
to more complex sociotechnical dimensions of capabilities. The chapter 
contends that analytic regimes such as Project Jefferson, with its tech-
nical objects and social machinery, can powerfully structure the way 
officials think, resulting in analytic and policy blind spots.
In the last chapter of Part II, Sam Weiss Evans and Emma Frow exam-
ine the shaping of concerns and nonconcerns relating to biosafety 
and biosecurity in two high-profile synthetic biology initiatives: the 
US-based Synthetic Biology Engineering Research Center (Synberc), and 
the international genetically engineered machine (iGEM) student com-
petition. They identify a variety of examples and strategies by which 
actors within these initiatives are rendering safety and security concerns 
visible and invisible. The suggestion is that each reflects a particular, 
situated understanding of and approach to “taking care,” with different 
implications for how the institutions, epistemic structures, practitioner 
identities, and artifacts of synthetic biology may develop. In these 
examples, they also strive to account for their own involvement as 
social scientists in the activities of Synberc and iGEM.
To return to the autostereogram metaphor, the chapters of Part III 
“Sights and Sensitivities” ask about the fruits of what comes into view 
when we attend to receptiveness. In “What Counts as the Hostile Use of 
Chemicals?” James Revill and Brett Edwards examine how only certain 
forms of violence have been regarded as instances of “chemical and 
biological weapon” attacks. Notably, despite their reliance on the toxic-
ity of chemicals (and thus technically being chemical weapons under 
existing international treaties), the large number of acid attacks, dis-
proportionally affecting women, that are perpetrated each year are not 
labeled as chemical weapon attacks. The contingency of how categories 
are constructed within the international community provides a basis 
for Revill and Edwards to offer a distinctive take on existing diplomatic 
efforts to control weapons of mass destruction.
As with many other contributions to this volume, Gerald Walther and 
Malcolm Dando’s chapter “A Phoenix of the Modern World” juxtaposes 
relatively identified and not identified implications of science. They use 
the mythological phoenix as a metaphor to explore the reemergence 
of the National Science Advisory Board. Although the rebirth and 
rise of the phoenix from the ashes is often drawn on metaphorically, 
Walther and Dando also draw attention to the period of absence and 
change while the phoenix is dormant. Furthermore, they ask what the 
mixed and uneven regard for the potential social consequences of brain 
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research means for practical efforts to avert such possibilities from being 
realized.
Regard for the implications of how concern is constituted and what 
this means for action is also a theme of “On Forming What isn’t There.” 
In this chapter Richard Moyes draws on his long time experience as a 
campaigner about the humanitarian effects of armed conflict to reflect 
on how contentions associated with the effects of weapon systems have 
been framed, as well as what these have meant for efforts to reduce 
injury and death to civilians. He offers practical experiences about 
how the adoption of particular ways of focusing can open up new 
space, opportunities that can be built on to bring about major reform 
of international conduct. Finally, his chapter examines the limitations 
about what can be said about such processes due to the constraints of 
diplomatic professional discourses.
Bounded professional discourse though characterizes all the contri-
butions to Absence in Science, Security and Policy. In recognition of this, 
we invite the reader to attend to the chapters of this volume through 
considering what they state and what they do not, how their arguments 
are understood and how they are not, as well as what sort of skills for 
opening up to new possibilities can be cultivated.
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